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Transparency, Disclosure and the Pricing of Future Earnings 
 
Abstract: The present study examines the role of disclosure in assisting market 
participants to form expectations of future earnings from the accrual content of 
reported earnings. Using the Transparency and Disclosure ratings prepared by 
Standard and Poor’s, we show how disclosure and accruals jointly affect the earnings 
expectations that are incorporated in current stock returns, depending not only on the 
magnitude, but also on their duration, i.e. whether they affect current or non-current 
operations, and their sign, i.e. whether they increase net operating assets (a positive 
net accrual) or decrease net operating assets (a negative net accrual).  
Keywords: corporate disclosure, accruals, share price anticipation of earnings.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The present study examines the role of disclosure in assisting market participants to 
form expectations of future earnings from the accrual content of reported earnings. 
Previous research (Schleicher and Walker, 1999; Lundholm and Myers, 2002; Gelb 
and Zarowin, 2002; Hussainey, Schleicher and Walker, 2003; Ettredge, Kwon, Smith 
and Zarowin, 2005; Schleicher, Hussainey and Walker, 2007; Hope, Kang, Thomas 
and Vasvari, 2008) has shown that, in general,  disclosure is able to enhance future 
earnings information in current stock returns, an effect which has also been 
investigated in a number of more specific contexts (e.g. income smoothing practices 
by Tucker and Zarowin, 2006; R&D expenditures by Oswald and Zarowin, 2007; 
dividend payments by Hanlon, Myers and Shevlin, 2007, and Hussainey and Walker, 
2009; cash flow reporting by Orpurt and Zang, 2009).  To the extent that these effects 
have generally been estimated without also taking the firm’s overall level of 
disclosure into account, it is clear that inferences about the likely market impact of 
disclosure can only be drawn directly from prior research results for the case where 
disclosure is at the average level.  Here, we show that such conclusions will change 
significantly when the level of disclosure varies.  Conversely, the role of disclosure in 
revealing relevant information on the prospects of the firm is also shown here to 
depend on the nature of the accruals appearing in the financial statements. In this 
respect, therefore, the present study addresses a significant gap in our understanding 
of accruals by providing an insight into the strength of the interaction between 
reported accounting numbers and further information made available by the firm, and 
we do so in an international context relevant to the contemporary setting of 
integrating capital markets.   
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In examining whether the information about future earnings in current returns is 
conditional upon disclosure, we acknowledge at the outset that accrual-based financial 
statements and other disclosed material may interact in conveying useful information 
about the future cash flows that outside investors may require for valuation. 
Christensen and Demski (2003, chapter 17) also maintain that these two features of 
financial reporting (disclosure and accrual) should be considered jointly in this 
context, and not separately. In a similar vein, Gietzmann and Trombetta (2003) 
demonstrate how investors condition their investment decisions upon disclosure and 
the accounting policies that govern the calculation of accounting results, and 
specifically in their case whether such policies are either conservative or aggressive.1  
Instead of accounting policies per se, the present study focuses on the underlying 
nature of accrual accounting and the complementary role of disclosure in revealing 
the relevance and reliability of accruals for the prediction of future earnings and cash 
flows. We also follow on therefore from Pope (2003), who points out that, holding 
economic uncertainty constant, there would be two primary aspects of accounting 
systems that affect the predictability of earnings: (1) the accruals measurement rules 
themselves, and (2) the degree of disclosure regarding the nature of the accruals, each 
of which can enhance or reduce the predictability of earnings and the components of 
earnings. The present study contributes by providing empirical evidence on this 
interplay between disclosure levels and accruals, insofar as it may assist market 
participants to anticipate future earnings, emphasizing 
- the sign of accruals, i.e. whether operating asset changes and operating 
liability changes together result in an increase in net operating assets (a 
                                                 
1
 In a related study, Gietzmann and Ireland (2005) find that different combinations of aggressive and 
conservative accounting, as suggested by the use of discretionary accruals, will affect the impact of 
disclosure on the cost of equity capital. 
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positive net accrual) or a decrease in net operating assets (a negative net 
accrual), and  
- the duration of accruals, knowing that current accruals will address matching 
and timing issues more speedily than non-current accruals.  
 
 Much accounting research has already investigated the role of accruals as a 
means of improving the relevance, usefulness and quality of financial statement 
information (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper, 
2005) and even the overall information quality of the firms involved (Ecker, Francis, 
Kim, Olsson and Schipper, 2006).2 Yet the ensuing studies by Core, Guay and Verdi 
(2008), Hribar and Nichols (2007), Liu and Wysocki (2007) and Wysocki (2007) have 
provided evidence that challenges the ability of accruals to reflect a firm’s earnings 
quality. Indeed, following Lev, Li and Sougiannis (2009), we should accept that the 
extensive use of accrual accounting as a means of improving the relevance of 
financial information may be jeopardized by the increasing difficulty of making 
reliable forecasts in fast-changing economies, and also by the frequent managerial 
misuse of estimates to manipulate financial data.    
 Thus, in this study, we emphasize the importance of the role of disclosure for 
the interpretation of accruals, even when these accruals may be misguided, or open to 
manipulation. We argue that adequate disclosure is necessary for market participants 
not only to be able to deal with the information contained in accruals in a timely 
manner, but also to assess the reliability of the future earnings and cash flow 
expectations arising from these accruals. In other words, the present study also 
                                                 
2
 More specifically, Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis at al. (2005) use the relation between a 
firm’s cash flow and its working capital accruals to measure earnings quality.  
 5 
investigates the ability of disclosure to have a further corrective influence by 
preventing the formation of over-optimistic or over-pessimistic earnings expectations 
associated with the accrual signal.   
A further innovation in this research study is to make use of a ‘global 
measure’ as a proxy for disclosure across a sample of firms drawn from a number of 
different jurisdictions. Most of the prior related research which discusses the impact 
of disclosure on share price anticipation employs samples drawn from just one 
specific jurisdiction (principally, either the US or the UK), providing evidence that is 
relevant only in the light of the characteristic features of the particular accounting 
environment. Such research tends to employ disclosure measures whose design and 
measurement are inevitably constrained by their own ‘jurisdiction-specific’ context. 
On the other hand, with internationally integrating markets, it has become 
increasingly important to understand economic consequences not only insofar as these 
may be determined by legal provisions and best practices within a specific 
jurisdiction, but additionally from the perspective of investors who diversify not only 
across domestic equities but also internationally.3 Thus, whilst there is strong 
evidence from the two well-researched jurisdictions mentioned above on the ability of 
disclosure to enhance the share price anticipation of earnings and cash flows, it is 
difficult to extrapolate from such country-specific evidence in order to evaluate the 
efforts of accounting standard setters and regulators towards harmonising accounting 
and disclosure on an international scale.  In other words, it has yet to be made clear 
whether, when and how more disclosure, defined from the perspective of an 
                                                 
3
  The revision of the IASB constitution in February 2009 puts considerable emphasis on the global 
character of IFRS (IASCF, 2009). Whilst the task of harmonising accounting and disclosure standards 
across the EU has been largely delegated to the one standard setter (IASB), the Commission still 
maintains a strong interest in internationalisation (e.g. EC Directives 2004/109/EC and 2007/14/EC ‘on 
the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose 
securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market’). 
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international user of financial reports, may contribute to the share price anticipation of 
future earnings in a multi-jurisdictional setting, consistent with the aspirations of the 
international accounting standard setters and regulators.4  The use of Standard and 
Poor’s ‘global measure’ of transparency and disclosure in this paper, together with a 
cross-national sample of firms, offers a suitable means of addressing such concerns, at 
least in a European context.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 develops the 
arguments on how accruals and disclosure affect market participants’ expectations of 
future earnings. Section 3 discusses the disclosure metric employed here, and Section 
4 presents the data employed in the study. Section 5 discusses the methodology and 
the related empirical results, and Section 6 concludes the study.  
                   
2. ACCRUALS, DISCLOSURE AND PRICE ANTICIPATION OF EARNINGS 
(i) The Role of Accruals  
The examination of share price anticipation of future earnings begins with Collins et 
al. (1994), who attribute the low association between returns and contemporaneous 
earnings to the lack of timeliness in accounting earnings in measuring value relevant 
events.6 By adding future earnings into the regression of current returns on current 
                                                 
4
 This research question remains timely even after the IFRS implementation across Europe, as variation 
in the institutional and regulatory influences continues to affect financial reporting. There is ample 
evidence that financial reporting practices across Europe are still deeply rooted in their local traditions 
despite extensive harmonization efforts, including the IFRS implementation in 2005 (Nobes and Kvaal, 
2008; Beuselinck, Joos and Van der Meulen, 2007). This is not surprising, given the evidence in Daske 
et al. (2008b) of the considerable discretion that firms have in implementing one set of uniform 
standards (IFRS) internationally, and how their adoption gives rise to heterogeneous economic 
consequences.  
 
6
 The (lack of) timeliness and the asymmetric timeliness of accounting earnings has been investigated 
in detail in numerous studies in empirical financial accounting (e.g. Basu, 1997; Pope and Walker, 
1999) either in an international context considering different sets of institutional arrangements (e.g. 
Ball et al., 2000; Giner and Rees, 2001; Ball et al., 2003; Dargenidou et al. 2007) or considering a set 
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earnings, they find that returns contain significant information on future earnings, 
with the future earnings response coefficient (FERC) in this context eventually 
‘catching up’ with the information in current earnings and other sources of current 
information about expected future earnings.7   
 In this study, we consider accrual accounting to be the principal tool employed 
in communicating information about future cash flows and future earnings. Pope 
(2003) argues that accruals that are based on the realization and matching principles 
reduce the variance of earnings relative to cash flows and create more permanent, 
predictable earnings components. Evidence in Dechow (1994) suggests that the 
increased use of accruals enhances the role of earnings as a measure of short-term 
performance, which better reflects expected cash flows, and particularly so with 
regards to working capital accruals relative to longer-term operating accruals8. Here, 
we adopt the usual convention in the research literature of referring to these two 
categories as current and non-current accruals. Current accruals, in particular, are seen 
to be more successful in mitigating matching and timing problems than non-current 
accruals, as confirmed by Guay and Sidhu (2001). Nevertheless, as these authors 
argue, non-current accruals will still reconcile timing and matching differences, but 
over longer intervals.9 As the latter implies a slower pace and higher uncertainty in 
establishing the economic benefits associated with non-current accruals, it is to be 
expected that the share price anticipation of information related to non-current 
                                                                                                                                            
of firm level characteristics including disclosure (e.g. Raonic et al., 2004; Garcia Lara, 2005; Barth et 
al., 2008) or as an important attribute of accounting earnings quality (Francis et al., 2004). 
7
 Collins et al. (1994) argue that inclusion ex post of the actual figure for future earnings in the 
regression of current returns on current and future earnings introduces an error in variables problem, as 
the theoretically correct regressor would be the unobservable expected future earnings. This 
measurement error problem biases estimates of the future earnings coefficients downwards. Collins et 
al. (1994) address this problem by including the future return as a control variable.  
8
 Dechow (1994) examines the association between current earnings with returns across quintiles of 
operating accruals which are decomposed into their working capital and long-term components.  
9
 Barth et al. (2001) argue that each accrual component reflects different information about future cash 
flows, and that aggregating all accrual components masks this information.  
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accruals would be slower than the share price anticipation associated with current 
accruals. 
 However, neither Dechow (1994) nor Guay and Sidhu (2001) take into 
account the conservative nature of accounting. Ball and Shivakumar (2006) and  
Dechow and Ge (2006) show that accruals are likely to provide more timely 
information in the case of  a loss of future economic benefits, with negative non-
current accruals being especially relevant in this respect (e.g. restructuring charges, 
goodwill impairments, and asset write-downs). Therefore, it is also argued that 
information on future earnings in current returns is likely to be more pronounced for 
accruals that increase operating liabilities or decrease operating assets, especially in 
cases where accounting conservatism already forces a more timely recognition of 
economic losses.  
Up until this point, accruals have been considered as a means of 
communicating information on future earnings and future cash flows. However, as the 
extensive research findings on earnings management suggest, accruals can also be the 
subject of management’s discretion. Earnings may be managed through accruals 
either for opportunistic reasons or for the purposes of communicating a sustainable 
level of future earnings, or, as noted earlier, because managers face increasing 
difficulty in a fast-changing economic environment when it comes to making reliable 
forecasts (Lev, Li and Sougiannis, 2009).  A more detailed approach to explaining 
accruals behavior is taken by Richardson, Sloan, Soliman and Tuna (2005), who find 
that the less reliable categories of accruals lead to lower earnings persistence, and also 
that investors do not fully anticipate this lower earnings persistence. Hirschleifer, 
Hou, Teoh and Zhang (2004) find that, for firms with ‘bloated balance sheets’ (i.e. 
firms with high net operating assets, where growing earnings are followed by 
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declining earnings), investors fail to predict lower future earnings in these 
circumstances and tend to overvalue such firms as a result.  Here, we argue in turn 
that the extreme magnitudes of the net accrual (whether a positive or negative change 
in net operating assets) are more prone to be unreliable and, hence, more susceptible 
to over-optimistic or over-pessimistic future earnings expectations. Due to timing 
effects, we argue also that this is more likely to happen with respect to current 
accruals rather than non-current accruals, as future economic benefits potentially take 
longer to be realised in future earnings. However, even with respect to non-current 
accruals, this may also happen when managers employ conservative accounting, 
accelerating and therefore shortening the timing of the recognition of economic losses 
(as in Dechow and Ge, 2006).  
 On the other hand, market participants not only use the accounting numbers on 
the face of the financial statements to predict future earnings but they also draw on a 
number of other sources, including qualitative information. Here it is argued that 
assessing the impact of accounting practices on the share price anticipation of 
earnings without taking into account other sources of information that also shape 
returns will produce an estimate of this impact only at the average level of such 
additional disclosure. The estimated relationship will not hold for all firms and might 
lead to erroneous conclusions, e.g. on the efficiency of a particular accounting 
practice to communicate relevant information. For instance, Oswald and Zarowin 
(2007) find that, relative to expensing, the capitalization of R&D is associated with a 
higher FERC, which is consistent with the view that the capitalisation decision sends 
a stronger signal concerning the future economic benefits arising from this asset. 
However, while this result holds under an average level of disclosure, it is unclear 
whether the investors would still attribute a higher value to recognised R&D as 
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opposed to expensed R&D if the capitalisation decision had not been sufficiently 
explained to market participants and, consequently, if the associated future economic 
benefits could not be adequately assessed by outsider investors. Therefore, in order to 
have a better understanding of the impact of accounting practices on market 
participants’ expectations, we need to consider the incremental and interaction effects 
of varying levels of disclosure.  
 
(ii) The Role of Disclosure   
Hope (2003) shows how a firm’s disclosure is useful in reducing uncertainty about 
future earnings and especially so in circumstances where alternative mechanisms are 
not available to improve the transparency of accounting numbers. In the same spirit, 
Barth (2004) notes that, if the primary objective of financial reporting is to provide 
users with information relating to the uncertainty and timing of future cash flows, 
disclosure is a key to complete reporting as it addresses the very issue of information 
uncertainty. 
 The above points firmly towards a combined role for disclosure, firstly to 
reveal economic gains or losses and secondly to mitigate the uncertainty surrounding 
the accounting numbers reported in the financial statements. That is, where 
accounting information is not transparent, disclosure may act to prevent this 
information from misleading future earnings expectations.  There is only limited 
evidence available in this respect to date; for instance, Louis, Robinson and Sbaraglia 
(2008) and Drake, Myers and Myers (2008) each find that accruals-related mispricing 
tends not to take place among firms with adequate disclosure.   
 As mentioned in the Introduction, the implications of increased disclosure for 
the share price anticipation of earnings have been investigated for samples of UK and 
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US companies in Schleicher and Walker (1999), Gelb and Zarowin (2002), Lundholm 
and Myers (2002), Hussainey et al. (2003) and Schleicher et al. (2007), all of whom 
show that better and more informative disclosure introduces more information on 
future earnings in current returns.11 Nevertheless, across both jurisdictions, the 
findings of the studies cited above, if taken at face value, could lead us to infer 
erroneously that more disclosure would necessarily increase information on future 
earnings in current returns, even inadvertently. Here, we need to acknowledge that 
current earnings already contain components that inform market participants about 
future earnings and cash flows, i.e. accruals, and that the different properties of these 
accruals might affect the ability of disclosure to communicate additional information 
on the future prospects of the firm.  A first attempt to address the impact of the 
interaction between disclosure and the components of financial reporting on share 
price anticipation of future earnings is Orpurt and Zang (2009), albeit with a very 
narrow focus on the benefits of the ‘direct method’ cash flow statement.13 
Considering the information in this statement as a form of supplementary voluntary 
disclosure over and above the information in the mandatory ‘indirect method’ 
statement, the authors find that the direct method components provide investors with 
                                                 
11
 Schleicher and Walker (1999) employ a measure of disclosure  which focuses on the assessment of 
the management’s discussion of operational and financial aspects based on the detailed guidance 
section included in the ASB statement ‘Operating and Financial Review’, as well as the 
recommendations of other local professional bodies (ICAS, ASSC). Gelb and Zarowin (2002) and 
Lundholm and Myers (2002) measure disclosure in terms of the quality of a firm’s information 
environment as perceived by financial analysts, with disclosure scores based on AIMR-FAF ratings.  
Hussainey et al. (2003) and Schleicher et al. (2007) produce their own disclosure scores by extracting 
forward-looking topics and statements from firm’s annual reports narratives. Another recent approach 
is the disclosure index constructed by Banghøj and Plenborg (2008), which involves 62 voluntary 
information indicators (across subcategories such as strategy, competition and outlook, production, 
sales and marketing and human capital), building on the Jenkins (1994) report, Botosan (1997), 
Pricewaterhouse-Coopers (1999) and the Nørby (2001) report, excluding any matters which are a 
statutory disclosure requirement under the Danish Financial Statement Act. 
13
 According to SFAS No.95, a firm may choose between producing only an indirect method statement 
or, alternatively, a direct method statement which must be supplemented with indirect method 
disclosures. It follows that firms should provide the indirect method cash flow information in all cases 
and that the direct method information is in the form of a voluntary disclosure.  
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information for estimating a company’s future performance that is incremental to that 
available from indirect method statements.  
As noted previously, the present study also addresses this interplay between 
disclosure and financial reporting in communicating future earnings expectations, but 
does so in a more explicit manner whereby the relevant aspect of financial reporting 
that is investigated is not the current cash flow, or its components, but instead is the 
usual means by which expectations of future cash flows are communicated in 
accounting, i.e. accruals.  
 While disclosure is already known to help unravel some of the implications of 
financial reporting for the future, we expect that an evaluation of the differential 
ability of current and non-current accruals to resolve matching and timing issues will 
be able to shed further light on how this disentangling of the accounts and associated 
disclosures is achieved. Self-serving manipulation and other considerations set aside, 
it is well established that current accruals are designed to address the matching and 
timing problems inherent in cash flows (Dechow, 1994) and that current accruals 
provide useful information regarding the continued persistence of earnings, or 
‘earnings power’, at least for the short term. In this context, we argue that disclosure 
is not likely to contribute further in assisting the share price anticipation of earnings 
for those firms that already communicate relevant information to investors by means 
of current accruals. Therefore, disclosure may be expected to play a more important 
role when it comes to the longer duration in which only non-current accruals can 
resolve the timing problems, especially given the inherent uncertainty which that 
involves. Hence, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
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H1:  At a minimum level of disclosure, the information revealed by 
current accruals enhances share price anticipation of earnings more 
than the information revealed by non-current accruals 
It follows that disclosure is deemed to be a necessary ingredient in enhancing the 
informativeness of financial reporting when matching and timing issues are not 
promptly addressed by means of the accounting numbers that are reported in financial 
statements. This is less likely to happen when reported accounting numbers are indeed 
performing their matching role. For example, the capitalisation of research and 
development expenses is likely to be more meaningful for investors as long as the 
firm provides adequate disclosure regarding its plans and also about the mechanisms 
that are in place to ensure that the related future economic benefits will eventually be 
generated from such R&D activities. On the other hand, current accruals, such as 
changes in receivables from customers and changes in payables to suppliers, are more 
able to provide information on the earnings power of the firm without further 
disclosure, although some additional information might be necessary even in these 
cases, if only to assess the reliability of current accruals.  
Recent research on accruals mispricing has also suggested a role for disclosure 
in enabling investors to correctly price the information in accruals concerning 
earnings persistence, even, as noted earlier, when accruals are less than transparent 
(e.g. Louis, Robinson and Sbaraglia, 2008 and Drake, Myers and Myers, 2008). 
Further evidence on mispricing related to accruals is also available with respect to the 
broader definition of total accruals that underlies the present study (e.g. Fairfield, 
Whisenant and Yohn, 2003; Richardson et al., 2005). However, we consider that the 
corrective influence of disclosure for non-current accruals may not be the same as for 
current accruals due to the differences between the two in their ability to deal with 
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uncertainty (see hypothesis H1). For instance, prior evidence suggests that, when the 
firm reports negative non-current accruals, such as impairment or restructuring 
charges, which reduce net operating assets, investors cannot readily assess the 
persistence of earnings and appear to overweigh the probability that the firm will be 
unsuccessful (Dechow and Ge, 2006). That is to say, the accelerated recognition of 
economic losses in reported earnings reduces earnings predictability.16  This issue is 
particularly pertinent with respect to information about increases in long-term 
liabilities and decreases in long-term assets, with the uncertainty surrounding their 
longer duration being compounded by the fact that they may not be transitory but may 
instead signal a reduction in permanent income, especially as a higher degree of 
verifiability may be demanded by shareholders in such cases.  We already argue that 
disclosure exerts a corrective influence where higher levels of uncertainty impede 
investors from assessing the persistence of earnings. As a result, it is only in the 
presence of high levels of relevant disclosure that negative non-current accruals can 
contribute effectively to the share price anticipation of earnings. This argument leads 
to the second hypothesis, as follows: 
H2: Disclosure enhances the share price anticipation of earnings 
when the information implied by accruals involves a high level of 
uncertainty; this is likely to be more pronounced in the cases where 
uncertainty triggers an accelerated recognition of economic losses, 
i.e. in the case of non-current accruals.     
On the other hand, in the case of current accruals, which tend to involve 
considerably less uncertainty, the role of disclosure in promoting share price 
                                                 
16 Watts and LaFond (2008) show how increases in accounting conservatism tend to follow increases 
in information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders.    
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anticipation is not obvious. Conjectures from research on the mispricing of accruals 
(including discretionary accruals) suggest that disclosure might mitigate the investors’ 
naïve fixation on reported earnings when accruals (either positive or negative) are 
very high, and particularly when the current accruals are extreme (e.g. Sloan 1996). In 
these cases, it might appear that disclosure acts by counteracting biases in the price 
anticipation of earnings, and it can be argued therefore that disclosure has a useful 
corrective role in preventing over-stated earnings expectations by over-confident 
investors who are fixated on the information provided by extreme magnitudes of 
current accruals.  Thus, our third hypothesis is as follows:  
H3:  With respect to current accruals, disclosure adjusts the share 
price anticipation of earnings as it curbs over-stated expectations 
arising from the extreme magnitudes of accruals.  
While both H2 and H3 imply a corrective influence of disclosure stemming 
from its ability to reveal future earnings, reduce uncertainty and assist investors in 
unravelling the implications of accruals for future earnings, the hypotheses point to a 
role for disclosure that differs substantially across accruals of shorter and longer 
duration, which can be attributed mainly to the inherent differences in the degree of 
uncertainty.  
 In sum, with respect to current accruals, disclosure enables investors to ‘fine 
tune’ their expectations and reduce exaggerated earnings predictions, and thus it 
exerts a mitigating role. On the other hand, in the context of non-current accruals, 
disclosure is a necessary complement in the process of creating accurate future 
earnings expectations that otherwise – in the absence of disclosure, or at the average 
level of disclosure – would be difficult for investors to interpret correctly.  
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 Finally, we note that a test of the impact of disclosure on share price 
anticipation is effectively a joint test of the proxy of disclosure that is employed. Prior 
research has revealed how the association with share price anticipation can vary 
across different measures of disclosure. For example, Hussainey et al. (2003) find 
little evidence that forward-looking statements in the discussion section of annual 
reports can improve the market’s ability to predict a firm’s future earnings, that is 
until they narrow down their definition of forward-looking information to forward-
looking profit statements. These findings are sufficiently robust to suggest that a test 
of share price anticipation of future earnings involving disclosure is also a test of a 
particular set of disclosures. In the context of the present study, we use a more 
broadly-based ‘global measure’, as discussed below,  so that we may draw inferences 
about the ability of the set of disclosures involved to bring forward information about 
future earnings regardless of where the firms are located.  
 
3. THE MEASUREMENT OF DISCLOSURE 
We have seen above that the main objective of this study is to examine the interplay 
between accounting and disclosure in informing investors’ expectations, and to carry 
this out in an international setting using a suitably ‘global’ measure of disclosure. 
Existing published research on disclosure (see Leuz and Wysocki, 2008) makes it 
clear that, in addition to mandated accounting items, investors also find the voluntary 
non-financial information released by companies useful for assessing a firm’s future 
performance. The available evidence in this case is based mainly on self-constructed  
measures of non-financial disclosure (i.e. Scheicher et al., 2007; Hussainey et al., 
2003) or on financial analysts’ ratings of disclosure (Lundholm and Myers, 2002; 
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Gelb and Zarowin, 200717), and the scores typically are with respect to large firms 
only, and mostly in the US. Prior research that addresses disclosure in a broader 
international context (e.g. Bushman, Piotroski and Smith, 2004; Hope, 2003a; Hope, 
2003b; Chang, Khanna and Palepu, 2000) generally uses the Centre for International 
Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR) index, which is constructed by examining 
annual reports for the omission or inclusion of a wide range of accounting items. 
Whilst the measure employed in our own study is similar in some respects to CIFAR, 
to the extent that it gives consideration to a set of variables relevant to firms operating 
in an international setting, the T&D index was designed by Standard and Poor’s 
specifically for their own international comparative study of the leading European 
firms that are constituents of the S&P Europe 350 index.19   
Ninety eight disclosure variables are used by Standard and Poor’s to construct 
the overall transparency and disclosure scores. They include financial, non-financial, 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures, and are divided into three broad categories: (a) 
financial transparency and information disclosure, (b) board and management 
structure and process, and (c) ownership structures and investor rights. By its nature, 
Standard and Poor’s T&D index may be compared directly with CIFAR, given that 
they are each designed with international comparison in mind. According to Salter 
(1998) and Hope (2003b), the main strengths of the CIFAR index are that it is based 
on actual annual reports, that the data is audited by external parties, that the 
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 Other studies include forms of voluntary disclosure activity such as conference calls with analysts 
that may either complement or substitute for financial reporting by revealing useful information to 
outside market participants (e.g. Frankel, Johnson and Skinner; 1999; Bushee, Matsumoto and Miller, 
2003). For further details on other researcher-constructed rankings, and AIMR, see also Botosan 
(1997), Hail (2002), Barton and Waymire (2004), Guo, Lev and Zhou (2004) and Lee, Shen and 
Petroni (2006).  
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 Although Khanna, Palepu, Srinivasan (2004) argue that the index measures corporate disclosure 
against an implicit US benchmark, Bushee (2004) finds that Standard and Poor’s T&D score covers a 
set of voluntary disclosures that are uncommon among US firms, but present in annual reports of firms 
from other countries, inferring that the T&D score recognizes that US practices are not necessarily the 
best possible standard.  
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information is clearly provided and that it covers three periods. By comparison, 
Standard and Poor’s T&D index relies on audited annual reports for just one fiscal 
year (2001/2), but its advantages are that it covers in greater detail voluntary non-
financial forward-looking information (i.e. future investment plans, management 
forecasts) and corporate governance data relating to the directors and owners, that it 
places more emphasis on narrative information in management analyses and forecasts 
(e.g. investment plans, industry trends), that it takes specific steps to reflect the 
complexity of the international setting in which the firms operate,23 and finally that it 
is more recent (CIFAR is discontinued).24  
 
4. DATA 
Standard and Poor’s Financial Transparency and Disclosure Survey of 2002 was 
conducted in 17 European countries and provides an initial sample of large and liquid 
European firms whose equity securities make up the S&P Europe 350.28 It should be 
noted that the Europe 350 is an index that is commonly used by US institutional 
investors with overseas holdings (Amromin et al., 2008), and therefore, while the 
evidence and inferences in this paper might not be generalizable to all European 
firms, this particular dataset nevertheless serves the main purpose of the present study, 
                                                 
23
 For example, in the case of France, in addition to gathering information from regulators, investors 
and companies, Standard and Poor’s recognized that the annual report is not the single main corporate 
disclosure document. In France, the Document de Reférénce is extensively used as a key source of 
company information in addition to annual reports. Thus, the T&D index includes the information 
disclosed in the Document de Reférénce for French companies. Similarly, for European companies that 
issue ADRs in the US, disclosures in the 20F forms that are filed with the SEC are considered and 
included in the companies’ scores.  
24
 In order to additionally test the validity of the index, we compare the T&D and CIFAR scores by 
country (see Appendix). The correlation coefficient between CIFAR and the Standard and Poor’s 
scores is 0.627 (with a p-value = 0.007). We further break down the T&D scores across the three sub 
categories and compare each index separately with the CIFAR index. We find significant correlations 
between CIFAR and the Financial Transparency and Information Disclosure index of 0.533  (p-value = 
0.027) and the Ownership Structure and Investor Rights index of 0.623 (p-value = 0.007).  
28
 Amromin, Harrison and Sharpe (2008) claim that the firms in the S&P 350 represent about 70% of 
European capitalisation, and they also note that the index itself is available for trading in the US.  
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which is to examine the share price anticipation of earnings in a context where firms 
address an international shareholder base. A further advantage of the focus on 
internationally visible firms is that it alleviates the problem of non-synchronicity of 
returns which can affect empirical inference in tests of share price anticipation when 
smaller firms with illiquid securities are sampled.  
We have excluded all of the Europe 350 constituents that are classified as 
financials (banking, investment, insurance), and, together with 2 other firms in the 
index that were omitted by Standard and Poor’s in their original Transparency and 
Disclosure Survey, the available initial sample is reduced to 268 firms. Further filters 
have also been applied, firstly by omitting firms for which the required accounting 
data items are not available, and then by performing the Hadi (1994) procedure for the 
detection of multivariate outliers, leading to a working sample of 238 firms and 683 
firm-year observations in the period 2000-2002. This three year time frame is chosen 
because it is contiguous with Standard and Poor’s survey period, as the corporate 
reports studied by the rating agency were those published for the fiscal year ending 
either in 2001 or in 2002, depending on the fiscal year-end month.29 As a measure of 
firm-level disclosure practices, Standard and Poor’s own T&D survey scores are used 
as the appropriate indicator of disclosure coverage in the key public documents 
released by the sampled companies, as discussed in the previous section.  
The annual financial statement data source is Worldscope, and Datastream for 
stock returns and market capitalization. Earnings are defined as net income before 
extraordinary items available to common shareholders, collected at accounting year-
end dates. A fiscal year-end restriction is not applied, and therefore companies are 
                                                 
29
 Consistent with a survey conducted by Graham, Campbell and Rajgopal (2005), which shows that 
managers are likely to avoid setting a precedent in disclosure that is difficult to maintain, it is assumed 
here that disclosure levels are not likely to change dramatically from year to year, 
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included that have reporting periods other than for the calendar year, together with 
those companies that changed the reporting-year end one or more times during the 
period. The observed stock price dates are matched to three months after the 
corresponding accounting year-ends and the return figures annualized to a standard 
52-week-year accordingly.  
The concept of accruals employed here builds on the approach taken by 
Richardson, Sloan, Soliman and Tuna (2005), who define the total net accrual as the 
sum of the changes in all assets and liabilities on the balance sheet. Their definition of 
the total accrual is given as 
Total Accrual   (1) 
where ΔCO is the change in current operating items on the balance sheet (current 
assets less current liabilities, excluding cash, short-term investments and short-term 
debt), ΔNCO  is the change in non-current operating items (long-term assets less 
long-term liabilities, excluding long-term debt, advances and non-equity investments), 
and ΔNF is the change in net financial assets.30  However, as the ability to generate 
profits is mainly driven by operating items, our study focuses strictly on the operating 
accrual components CO and CO.31 Finally, as this study is concerned to 
                                                 
30
 More specifically, NCO  is the change in net non-current operating assets NCOt – NCOt-1, where 
NCO is non-current operating assets (NCOA) less non-current operating liabilities (NCOL). NCOA, 
non-current operating assets, is equal to total assets less current assets less long-term other non-
operating investments; NCOL, non-current operating liabilities, is equal to total liabilities less current 
liabilities less long-term debt excluding capitalized leases. CO, the change in current accruals is 
defined as COt – COt-1. CO is calculated as current operating assets (COA) less current operating 
liabilities (COL) where current operating assets is equal to current assets less cash and short term 
investments, and current operating liabilities is equal to current liabilities less short-term debt and the 
current portion of long-term debt. 
31
  Richardson, Sloan, Soliman and Tuna (2005) demonstrate how the computation of the net operating 
accrual as operating asset increases less operating liability increases is equivalent in total to earnings 
less operating cash flow (see also Penman and Yehuda, 2009). This approach implies that there are two 
components to earnings: operating cash flow plus operating accruals.  However, this contrasts with the 
perspective taken in some other studies (e.g. Dechow, Richardson and Tuna, 2003) where accruals are 
described as operating cash flow less income. Logically, the former leads to positive accruals that are 
asset-increasing, the convention that we adopt in this paper, whereas the sign switch implicit in the 
latter would imply that it is liability-increasing accruals that take the positive sign. Note also that the 
term accruals typically refers in this context to both accruals and deferrals, with the accrual of revenues 
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understand how disclosure interacts with the uncertainty inherent in accruals of 
increasing magnitude, regardless whether they reflect an increase or decrease in net 
operating assets, we base much of the analysis below on the absolute values | CO| 
and | CO|.   
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the sample. Panel A gives the mean, 
median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the market return and the 
accounting income variables employed in the study, together with similar descriptives 
for the absolute values of the current net accrual and the non-current net accrual, and 
for the disclosure scores.32 Panel B reports the correlations between these variables. 
As expected, current return Rt is significantly associated with current earnings Xt and 
future earnings Xt+1; similarly, future returns Rt+1 are also associated with future 
earnings Xt+1. However, one concern is the significant negative correlation between 
current and future returns at -0.39. Similar findings are reported in related studies 
whose sample time frames include the period examined in the present study, e.g. 
Orpurt and Zang (2009) who examine the period from 1989-2002 in the US, and 
Schleicher et al. (2007) whose data cover the period between 1996 to 2002 in the UK, 
and who also report a significant negative correlation between Rt and Rt+2, at -0.212. 
Orpurt and Zang (2009) believe that, under these circumstances, future returns may 
influence the regression results beyond their role as a measurement error proxy. 
However, a prediction in this respect could only be speculative. More importantly, it 
can be seen that more disclosure is associated positively with higher magnitudes of 
                                                                                                                                            
and the deferral of costs each increasing net operating assets, and the accrual of expenses and the 
deferral of revenues each decreasing net operating assets. We note, for future reference, that this 
appears to be an area where researchers should undertake to define terms very carefully, especially to 
avoid ambiguity with regard to usages in practice, as it is not unusual to find notes to financial accounts 
that may make use of terms such as ‘accruals and deferred income’ (amongst liabilities) and 
‘prepayments and deferred costs’ (amongst assets), which in this case would imply that accruals are 
liability increasing. 
32
  Note that (i) absolute accruals and (ii) the T&D disclosure score are each transformed into decile 
rankings for the regression fits reported in the next section of the paper. 
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the net non-current accrual (0.13), whereas the association is in the opposite direction 
with respect to the net current accrual (-0.19), which is consistent with managers’ 
attempts to address the uncertainty surrounding non-current accruals. Note also the 
strong correlations between the non-current accrual and earnings - it seems that during 
a difficult period characterised by negative returns (as can be seen in the descriptive 
statistics), non-current accruals have taken on the task of introducing bad news into 
earnings, a point to which we return in the analysis that is discussed in the next 
section of this paper.33  
 
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
(i) Effects of Disclosure on the Price Anticipation of Earnings 
In this section, we develop the empirical models with which we may examine the 
interplay between levels of corporate disclosure and the different properties of 
accruals that we have highlighted earlier.  The approach here is based on a multiple 
regression model proposed by Collins et al. (1994) and further employed in 
Schleicher and Walker (1999), Lundholm and Myers (2002), Gelb and Zarowin 
(2002) and other subsequent studies that investigate the differential influence of the 
disclosure level on the association between contemporaneous returns and future 
earnings, after removing the effects of current earnings, prior earnings and future 
returns. The linear model may be presented schematically so that the first row 
highlights the kernel of the future earnings response conditional on disclosure, with 
the earnings-returns displacement effects and their corresponding interactions with 
disclosure being set out underneath, as follows: 
                                                 
33
 The Lundholm and Myers (2002) study on the other hand, has been conducted in a period 
characterised by high returns (mean: 0.18 and median 0.13). According to the present study’s findings 
it seems that disclosure brings the future forward in any of these cases.  
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where t,iR  is the stock return of the i
th
 firm for year t measured over the 12 month 
period ending three months after the fiscal year end, DISi is the decile rank for firm i 
with regard to Standard and Poor’s Financial Transparency and Disclosure (T&D) 
Score, and 
, 1i tX  is the firm’s earnings before extraordinary items in year t+1 scaled 
by the market capitalization of the firm three months after the year t fiscal year end. 
The remaining variables are scaled current earnings 
,i tX , scaled prior earnings , 1i tX  
and future returns 
, 1i tR . Note that all regressions in the current study include a control 
for firm panels and a further control for country effects, which is employed here to 
proxy for cross-jurisdiction differences in institutional arrangements. 
 The coefficients on Xt and Xt-1 are expected to be positive and negative 
respectively, reflecting the mean-reverting nature of earnings. This is consistent with 
prior findings, including those reported by Collins et al. (1994), who point out that 
using the actual future earnings introduces an error in variables problem in the 
regression of current returns on current earnings and future earnings as the 
theoretically correct regressor is the unobservable expected future earnings. This 
measurement error problem biases estimates of the future earnings coefficients 
downward, which is addressed by including future share price returns Rt+1 as a control 
variable, whose coefficient is expected to be negative.34  
                                                 
34
 Collins et al. (1994) and Hussainey and Walker (2009) use realized changes in current (Xt) and 
future earnings (Xt+1) to proxy for unexpected earnings in current period and for current changes in 
expectations about future earnings. They also include the prior year’s earnings/price ratio and growth in 
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It is the coefficient on Xt+1, the future earnings response coefficient (FERC), 
that captures share price anticipation of earnings. It follows that the coefficient on 
DIS*Xt+1 measures the extent to which this price anticipation of future earnings is 
greater for higher levels of disclosure. In the first two columns in Panel A of Table 2, 
the results for the estimation of regression (2) suggest that, for the firm with minimum 
disclosure, current returns appear to be strongly associated with current earnings (the 
coefficient on Xt is 1.348, p-value<0.01) and to a lesser degree with future earnings, 
the main variable of interest in this study (the coefficient on Xt+ 1 is 0.208 with a p-
value=0.03). On the other hand, the negative and significant interaction DIS*Xt (-
0.128, p-value<0.01) suggests that the relevance of current earnings declines as 
disclosure activity reveals more earnings news relevant to the future, the significant 
and positive coefficient on DIS*Xt+ 1 (0.077, p-value<0.01) reinforcing the inference 
that disclosure reveals value-relevant information which enhances the association 
between current returns and future earnings, in line with the prior evidence (e.g. Gelb 
and Zarowin, 2002; Lundholm and Myers, 2002; Hussainey and Walker, 2009).35 
Furthermore, in the context of the present study, it is evident that our global measure 
of disclosure is strongly associated with an enhancement of the share price 
anticipation of future earnings, even for firms that originate and operate across 
different jurisdictions. 
                                                                                                                                            
book value of assets at the beginning of the year to control for measurement errors in current and future
 
earnings growth. These measurement errors concern earnings growth in the current period and the 
future that was anticipated at t-1. In contrast to Collins et al. (1994) and Hussainey and Walker (2009), 
Lundholm and Myers’ (2002) use the level of Xt and Xt-1 to proxy for unexpected current earnings, 
arguing that this allows the regression to find the best representation of the prior expectation for current 
earnings, whereas the approach in Collins et al., of using changes in earnings, implies that earnings 
follow a random walk process. Lundholm and Myers (2002) also observe that using the level of 
earnings in the past, present and future years is equivalent to using the level of past earnings and the 
changes in current and future earnings (footnote 5, p.814).   
 
35
 This finding is consistent also with Francis, Shipper and Vincent (2002), who demonstrate how 
increases in the market value attached to earnings announcements are mainly explained by greater 
concurrent disclosure rather than through bottom-line earnings.  
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(ii) Interaction Effects of Disclosure and Accruals on Price Anticipation 
As indicated, the aim of our empirical analysis is not only to examine disclosure 
effects but also to investigate the extent to which accrual estimates in current financial 
statements contribute to the price anticipation, in terms of the information they reveal 
about future earnings expectations. Moreover, we consider three different aspects of 
accruals - their magnitude, their duration (i.e. whether they are current or non-current) 
and the sign of the net accrual (i.e. whether operating asset increases are greater than 
or less than operating liability increases) - in examining the impact of different levels 
of corporate disclosure on these different dimensions of accrual accounting.  
In this respect, we develop a measure of accrual magnitude that is defined by 
the decile rankings of sample observations, based on the absolute value of the net 
accrual at time t, where observations within the lowest (highest) 10% of absolute 
value of the net accrual are assigned the rank of 1 (10), with ACCi,t therefore denoting 
the decile ranking for firm i in period t. As mentioned earlier, we carry out this 
procedure separately for both current accruals and non-current accruals, and we 
extend the model in (2) by incorporating these decile ranks of accruals and interacting 
them with each of the explanatory variables, as follows: 
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 The estimated effects attributable to the magnitude of accruals are set out for 
varying levels of corporate disclosure (DIS) in the columns on the right hand side of 
Panel A in Table 2, firstly with respect to the current net accrual and secondly the 
non-current net accrual. For current accruals, the coefficient on ACCt*Xt+1 is positive 
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and significant (0.302, p-value<0.01), suggesting that current accruals contribute in 
providing timely information on future earnings even for firms with the minimum 
level of corporate disclosure. This evidence is in line with the empirical findings 
documented in Dechow (1994) and the arguments in Pope (2003) regarding the role 
of accruals in enhancing the predictability of earnings components. Given that the 
variables are deflated for firm size, the greater magnitudes of the scaled current net 
accrual may simply entail the incorporation of more accrual components, and we 
suspect that these additional components may be inherently more unreliable, and that 
in turn they are likely to generate over-optimistic expectations of future profits or 
over-pessimistic expectations of future losses (Hirschleifer et al., 2004; Richardson et 
al., 2005). Here, corporate transparency and disclosure – achieved either through the 
application of good quality accounting standards (e.g. US GAAP or IFRS) or through 
the provision of voluntary narrative information (e.g. management earnings forecasts, 
investment plans) – can be seen to mitigate such exaggerated earnings expectations in 
current returns. That is, hypothesis H3 is confirmed by a negative and significant 
interaction coefficient (-0.026, p-value<0.01) on DIS*ACCt* Xt+1.36  
In addition, the results regarding the effects of the non-current net accrual 
( NCO) on the price anticipation of earnings, suggest that, for low disclosers, the 
incorporation of information on future earnings into current prices has a significantly 
smaller effect relative to current accruals, as indicated by the coefficient on 
                                                 
36
 Hussainey and Walker (2009) also apply this type of interaction  and interpret the coefficient by 
arguing that when this is positive it implies complementary information and when this is negative, 
substitute information from accruals and disclosure The negative interaction coefficient DIS*ACC* Xt+1 
denotes also substitution as discussed in Hussainey and Walker (2009). While we know that extended 
disclosure curbs overstated expectations and mispricing arising from extreme accruals (e.g. Louis et al., 
2008; Drake et al., 2008), we may attribute the ability of disclosure to curb over-stated expectations by 
substituting the current accruals’ information in investors’ share price anticipation of earnings (e.g. 
extreme positive changes in receivables are less likely to initiate unreasonably optimistic earnings 
expectation when the management plans are also disclosed and the corporate governance arrangements 
are sufficiently explained so that investors are able to assess the extent to which the managers are likely 
to engage with earnings management). 
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ACCt*Xt+1, which is lower in magnitude (-0.097) and in statistical significance (p-
value=0.08) than the corresponding coefficient for the current net accrual (0.302, as 
indicated above). The difference between these two coefficients on ACCt*Xt+1 is 
statistically significant (p-value<0.01), as shown in the last column of this panel of 
results. In sum, the findings presented here, which are consistent with Guay and Sidhu 
(2001), lend support to hypothesis H1 that matching and timing is slower and less-
pronounced for non-current accruals.  
As argued at the outset, this can be expected in the case of non-current 
accruals, whose economic impact affects the income statement at a slower pace and 
with a higher level of uncertainty. More specifically, the findings in Table 2 suggest 
that the information provided by disclosure and by non-current accruals are 
complements in the share price anticipation of earnings.37 Both signs on the 
coefficients on the interaction between Xt+ 1 and each of ACCt and DIS are negative 
(albeit weakly significant and insignificant, respectively), and the coefficient of the 
three-way interaction DIS*ACCt*Xt+1 is significant and positive (0.016, p-
value=0.04). This finding confirms hypothesis H2, suggesting that neither non-current 
accruals nor disclosure can provide adequate information regarding future earnings by 
themselves, but instead it is their interaction that makes the information in each of 
them more valuable.  
Of course, it is not surprising that the coefficient on the net non-current 
accrual is only weakly significant, as the economic benefits of non-current accruals 
are likely to take a longer time to materialise.38 Overall, it can be seen that the 
interaction between accruals and disclosure differs in nature between current and non-
                                                 
37
 The interpretation of the findings in this case builds on Hussainey and Walker (2009).  
38
  This interpretation is tested further, and confirmed, by means of robustness checks assessing price 
anticipation over three years ahead instead of just one year ahead, as described in greater detail later in 
the paper. 
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current items, with disclosure enhancing the share price anticipation of earnings 
mainly when the information implied by accruals involves a high level of uncertainty. 
This is demonstrated clearly in Figure 1. For example, it is evident how current 
accruals are typically included in investors’ expectations of future earnings at all 
levels of disclosure (see the positive slope of FERC with respect to accruals in the 
first graph), with high levels of disclosure exerting a mitigating role by curbing the 
over-statement of earnings expectations.  On the other hand, with respect to non-
current accruals, it is only at maximum levels of disclosure that investors are able to 
form any expectations of future earnings on the basis of the figures that are reported. 
Moreover, the findings reported in Panel A of Table 2 and demonstrated in Figure 1 
suggest that, when disclosure is of the highest standard, the contributions of current 
and non-current accruals to the share price anticipation of earnings are in fact quite 
similar. 
The analysis is continued by fitting the regression in (3) separately for firm-
years where there is either a positive net accrual (i.e. an increase in net operating 
assets) or a negative net accrual (i.e. a decrease in net operating assets), as accounting 
conservatism suggests that increasing liabilities and falling asset values should give 
rise to more timely information than in the opposite case where liabilities decline 
and/or  assets increase, especially in the case of non-current accruals. These results 
are set out in Panels B and C of Table 2.   
Consider first the effects when the net accrual is negative, when liability 
accruals exceed asset accruals. We again focus on the earnings interactions with 
ACCit, the measure that is ranked from 1 to 10 with increasing accruals magnitude. 
For current items, the coefficient on ACCt*Xt+ 1 is positive and statistically significant 
(0.176, p-value<0.01), consistent with the value-enhancing role of current accruals 
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discussed earlier. However, in contrast to the above, in the case of non-current items, 
the coefficient on ACCt*Xt+1 is negative and statistically significant (-0.312, p-
value<0.01). Accounting conservatism forces an accelerated recognition of economic 
losses (for example, asset write-downs, restructuring charges) and, when this takes 
place, disclosure becomes a necessary complement in unravelling the related 
uncertainty.  An important point to note here is that extreme levels of negative non-
current accruals may induce over-pessimistic future earnings anticipation in current 
prices, compromising the market participants’ ability to predict future earnings. We 
find evidence that increased levels of disclosure mitigate over-pessimistic earnings 
expectations and enhance price anticipation in this respect. This is indicated by the 
positive and significant coefficient on DIS*ACCt*Xt+ 1 (0.036, p-value<0.01) when the 
net non-current accrual is negative.  
For positive net accruals, where operating assets increase by more than 
operating liabilities (or alternatively where the operating liabilities fall by more than 
the operating assets), we find that the coefficient ACCt*Xt+1 is positive and statistically 
significant for current items (0.178, p-value=0.01) and insignificant for non-current 
items (0.081, p-value=0.22). Thus, on balance, we may infer that positive current 
accruals improve the market’s ability to anticipate future short-term earnings 
performance, whereas positive non-current accruals are less successful in anticipating 
one year ahead earnings. This is not surprising, considering that non-current accruals 
are likely to be useful in resolving matching and timing problems over longer time 
horizons, in line with the prior evidence in Guay and Sidhu (2001).  
 
(iii)  Cash-flow Effects of Accruals and Disclosure  
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In this section, we reappraise the significant findings reported above by examining the 
association between disclosure levels and the pricing of future cash flows, rather than 
future earnings. Recent work on the price anticipation of future cash flows is included 
in the study by Tucker and Zarowin (2006) into the effect of discretionary accruals, 
on the grounds  that, ultimately, equity valuation is said to rely on predictions of cash 
flows and not on earnings.39 In the context of the present study, where the focus is on 
the timing issues inherent in accrual accounting, a similar argument may be put 
forward in that, if the share price anticipation of earnings is likely to have a significant 
cash flow content, then it follows that disclosure should assist the price anticipation of 
the cash flow component of future earnings.  
Accordingly, the future earnings variable Xt+1 in (2) above is decomposed into 
its cash and accrual components as follows:   
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where CFXt+ 1 is the cash flow component of future earnings and AXt+ 1 is the 
operating accrual component. Unlike others, we do not decompose past and current 
earnings as well, as the aim now is solely to establish the contribution of accruals at 
time t to the share price anticipation of the future cash flow at time t+1. Therefore, the 
only coefficients of interest here are CFXt+ 1 and DIS*CFXt+ 1.  If disclosure assists the 
market in anticipating future cash flows, we would expect to see a positive coefficient 
on DIS*CFXt+ 1. The results from regression (4) are reported in the first two columns 
in Panel A of Table 3. The findings suggest that, under minimum disclosure, there is 
                                                 
39
 Similar estimations are also reported by Orpurt and Zang (2009), and a more general discussion of 
the economic consequences of disclosure with respect to cash flow estimates can be found in Lambert, 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2007). 
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weak evidence of cash flow effects (coefficient on CFXt+ 1 is 0.154, p-value=0.10).  
On the other hand, the interaction DIS*CFXt+1 is significantly positive (0.082 with a 
p-value<0.01) suggesting that disclosure improves the market’s anticipation of the 
cash flow component of future earnings.   
Estimates with regard to the interaction between accruals and disclosure are 
obtained by extending (3) above in the same way, as follows:   
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The coefficients of interest here are now DIS*CFXt+ 1, ACCt*CFXt+ 1 and 
DIS*ACCt*CFXt+1. The remaining columns in Panel A of Table 3 report on the effects 
of accrual magnitude, and Panels B and C set out the results when (5) is fitted 
separately for negative net accruals and positive net accruals. The evidence 
corroborates the earlier findings in Table 2, showing that the share price anticipation 
of earnings is largely attributable to the cash flow component of future earnings. 
Furthermore, it can be seen that the information revealed by current accruals 
contributes more to price anticipation of future cash flow than the information 
revealed by non-current accruals (the coefficient on ACC*CFXt+1 is significantly 
higher for the current net accrual at 0.272 than it is for non-current net accrual at -
0.094, and the likelihood that these coefficients may be equal is less than 0.01). It is 
also evident that disclosure continues to mitigate overstatements arising from higher 
levels of the current net accrual, in this case specifically with respect to expected 
future cash flows (there is a significant coefficient of -0.023 on DIS*ACCt*CFXt+1). 
Finally, we can see that disclosure again complements non-current accruals in the 
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price anticipation of the cash flow component of future earnings, such that jointly they 
have a positive effect (the coefficient on DIS*ACCt*CFXt+1 is significant at 0.021 for 
the non-current net accrual). These results are in line with the notion that investors 
focus on predicting cash flows when interpreting accruals and incorporating related 
information into their equity valuations. 
 
6. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS  
(i) Extending the Expectations Window from One to Three Years Ahead 
The tests reported above in 5(i) and 5(ii) have been repeated here using a longer 
future earnings stream, specifically for three years ahead, which appears to be the 
standard practice in share price anticipation studies. The choice of three years arises 
from the findings by Collins et al. (1994), who demonstrate that there is no 
statistically significant association between current stock returns and future earnings 
beyond that time. An examination of future earnings aggregated over a three year 
period would lead in the present study to the inclusion of earnings figures reported 
under IFRS in 2005, which could introduce unnecessary complications in the 
interpretation of the results, so we conduct the robustness test in its standard form for 
the years 2000 and 2001 only, extending the investigation window to take into 
account the sum of future earnings over the three years 2001-2003 and 2002-2004 
respectively.  
The robustness tests of H1 to H3 are reported in Panel A of Table 4. As 
explained above, Xt+1 is substituted by Xt+1+Xt+2+Xt+3, and for convenience we denote 
these cumulative earnings over the next three years as X3t+3. It may be noted that the 
control for one year ahead share price returns Rt+1 is also replaced in the estimation, 
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by three-year buy and hold returns (again for the period ending three months after the 
accounting year end). The results in Table 4 reveal the short-lived impact of the 
influence of current accruals, with an insignificant coefficient on ACCt*X3t+3 (0.011 
for the rank of all net accruals, p-value: 0.41; 0.017 for the rank of negative net 
accruals, p-value: 0.22; 0.044 for the rank of positive net accruals, p-value: 0.13). 
This is in contrast to the findings reported in Table 2 with respect to the larger and 
statistically significant coefficients on ACCt*Xt+1. Nevertheless, disclosure continues 
to exert its corrective influence when accruals are large, as shown by the significantly 
negative coefficients on DIS*ACCt*X3t+3 (-0.008 for the rank of negative net accruals, 
p-value: <0.01; -0.010 for the rank of positive net accruals, p-value: <0.01).
 
 On the other hand, it is the information regarding non-current accruals that is 
found to be particularly important in this longer window, given the strongly 
significant positive coefficients with respect to both the magnitude of the non-current 
net accrual (0.015 for the rank of all accruals, p-value: <0.01) and with respect to 
either sign (0.050 for the rank of negative net accruals, p-value: <0.01; 0.018 for the 
rank of positive net accruals, p-value: <0.01).   
Taking together the evidence in Tables 2 and 4, it appears that the share price 
anticipation of earnings in the longer term is mainly attributable to the non-current 
component of total operating accruals, while the share price anticipation of earnings 
in the shorter term is mainly determined by the current component. Not only does this 
test confirm the hypothesis with respect to the different roles of current and non-
current accruals in the share price anticipation of earnings, but also it confirms the 
complementary role of disclosure, and reveals it to be more pervasive, as it was 
mostly inferred beforehand only with respect to negative non-current accruals, where 
accounting conservatism accelerates the recognition of economic losses.  
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(iii) Controlling for Potentially Omitted Correlated Variables 
Since it is well established that disclosure is positively associated with firm size, it 
might be asked whether the findings of this study are driven by size rather than 
disclosure; however, since the sample examined by Standard and Poor’s  includes 
only the largest firms in Europe, we do not expect the variation in company size to 
affect significantly the empirical evidence here. On the other hand, an important 
determinant of the level of disclosure is likely to be the exposure of such firms to the 
US market and, if they are cross-listed in the US, their compliance with the increased 
levels of disclosure required by SEC.  A second point to consider is that other studies 
of the share price anticipation of future earnings (e.g. Schleicher et al. 2007; 
Hussainey and Walker, 2009) also account for firm growth, as it is only high growth 
firms that are likely to derive much of their value from future earnings. Finally, we 
give consideration to the proviso in Schleicher et al. (2007) that, in the case of loss-
making firms, current income is not a good guide to the longer-term earnings of the 
firm.   
The tests in Panel B of Table 4 re-examine hypotheses H1 to H3 by taking into 
account the size of each firm in the sample (based on market capitalisation), their 
growth (by means of the rate of change in total assets), their exposure to the US 
capital market (by using a binary variable to indicate cross-listing), and the sign of 
earnings (by using another binary variable to distinguish profit-making from loss-
making firms). The findings confirm that, whilst exposure to the US enhances share 
price anticipation of future earnings, albeit mainly when the net accrual is positive 
(0.530, p-value <0.01 for the net current accrual; 0.482, p-value<0.01 for the net non-
current accrual), the main effect of disclosure is unaffected by this interaction, which 
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again establishes that the proxy DIS is useful as a global measure of disclosure. Also, 
consistent with previous research, the asset base growth is again associated with more 
future earnings information in current returns, and share price anticipation is seen to 
become more difficult for loss-making firms, as predicted by Scheicher et al. (2007). 
These last two controls are evidently particularly important, with statistically 
significant coefficients in the predicted direction, i.e. significantly positive for 
growing firms (0.553, p-value<0.01 for the net current accrual; 0.483, p-value<0.01 
for the net non-current accrual) and significantly negative for loss-makers (-0.374, p-
value<0.01 for the net current accrual; -0.419, p-value<0.01 for the net non-current 
accrual).  Finally, we note that size variation is not important, as predicted, since the 
T&D sample represents the largest firms in Europe. Chiefly, Table 4 shows that our 
earlier inferences still hold, after implementing the above controls.  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
Previous research has shown that disclosure enhances the inclusion of future earnings 
news in current returns. Others have examined the inclusion of these earnings 
expectations in share pricing with respect to the actual accounting numbers that are 
reported by firms, the accounting practices that are employed in drawing up the 
financial statements, and the financial decisions that ensue. The present study 
contributes by showing in greater detail how the impact of accruals on market 
participants’ future earnings expectations is conditional upon disclosure, and 
dependent also on the type of accrual involved. More specifically, by making clear the 
difference between current and non-current accruals, and pointing to their ability to 
resolve timing issues, we provide evidence that disclosure has differential incremental 
effects which depend on the duration of the accruals.  
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The evidence here is relevant and timely in the post-IFRS era, as there is 
initial evidence elsewhere that managers still apply recognition principles in a manner 
that is influenced by local institutional features, with financial reports at the same time 
becoming accessible to a more international base of investors who assess equity 
investments based on the common denominator of disclosure requirements set down 
in IFRS. Here, it is shown that, even in the period immediately prior to mandated 
IFRS, the market’s share price anticipation of earnings across Europe was already 
conditioned by the disclosure level, as captured by the global T&D measure used 
here. This is new evidence that would be difficult to extrapolate from other 
jurisdiction-specific research.41 
 The findings in this study have implications also for our understanding, and 
interpretation, of a great number of accounting research studies which claim that 
market participants can be misled by accruals manipulation. The results show that this 
prior evidence depends critically upon the level of additional disclosure concerning 
the accounting numbers reported in statutory financial statements, and must be 
interpreted accordingly.   
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 TABLE 1 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 -----Returns----- --------Earnings-------- Accruals Magnitudes Disclosure 
 
Current 
Returns 
Future 
Returns 
Prior 
Earnings 
Current 
Earnings 
Future 
Earnings 
Absolute 
Current 
Accruals 
Absolute 
Non-current 
Accruals 
Standard and Poor’s 
Transparency and 
Disclosure Score 
 Rt Rt-1 Xt-1 Xt Xt+1 | CO| | CO| DIS 
Mean -0.1264 0.0231 0.0491 0.0311 0.0201 0.0338 0.1172 64.697 
Median  -0.1188 -0.0091 0.0491 0.0440 0.0478 0.0232 0.0695 66.670 
Standard deviation 0.3244 0.5053 0.0705 0.1045 0.1260 0.0376 0.1494 11.138 
Minimum  -0.9320 -0.9320 -0.5631 -0.9530 -0.9530 0.0001 0.0001 32.980 
Maximum 1.7709 4.0333 0.4936 0.4420 0.2871 0.4030 0.9725 88.780 
 
Panel B: Correlations (p-values) 
 Rt Rt+1 Xt-1 Xt Xt+1 | CO| | CO|  
Rt+1 -0.3902        
 
0.000        
Xt-1 0.2498 -0.1607       
 
0.000 0.000       
Xt 0.3285 -0.1864 0.4639      
 
0.000 0.000 0.000      
Xt+1 0.3020 0.1167 0.2338 0.3729     
 
0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000     
| CO| -0.0053 -0.0523 -0.0482 -0.0117 -0.0121    
 
0.891 0.172 0.208 0.759 0.752    
| CO| -0.0370 0.0208 -0.1271 -0.1788 -0.1560 0.1059   
 
0.334 0.587 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.006   
DIS -0.0147 -0.0102 -0.0629 -0.1256 -0.1226 -0.1859 0.1309  
 
0.702 0.791 0.101 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001  
 
 44 
Notes: Current returns Rt   for year t are annual buy-and-hold returns for the 12-month period starting three months after the year t-1 fiscal year end. Future returns Rt+1 are the 
annual buy-and-hold returns for the year starting three months after the current fiscal year-end. Current earnings Xt for year t are the income before extraordinary items 
available to common shareholders, scaled by market value (closing price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding, three months after the year t-1 fiscal year end). 
Future earnings Xt+1 (prior earnings Xt-1) are the income before extraordinary items available to ordinary shareholders for the year following (preceding) the current year, 
scaled by market value three months after the year t fiscal year end. |ΔCO| and |ΔNCO| are the absolute values of current and non-current operating accruals, scaled by the 
average of total assets at the beginning and end of the fiscal year. DIS is the decile rank of disclosure, where disclosure is measured by Standard and Poor’s Composite T&D 
score (see Appendix for further details). 
 45 
 
TABLE 2 
The joint effects of accruals and disclosure on the share price anticipation of earnings 
 A. All Firm-Year Observations B. Liability Accruals > Asset Accruals 
(net accruals are income-decreasing) 
C.  Liability Accruals < Asset Accruals 
(net accruals are income-increasing) 
 
Total 
Accruals 
Current  
Accruals 
Non-current  
Accruals Diff. 
Current  
Accruals 
Non-current  
Accruals Diff. 
Current  
Accruals 
Non-current  
Accruals Diff. 
 
| CO+ NCO| | CO| | NCO| 
 
| CO| | NCO| 
 
| CO| | NCO| 
 
 
Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t p-value Coeff. t Coeff. t p-value Coeff. t Coeff. t p-value 
Xt+1 0.208 0.03 -1.278 0.00 0.925 0.01 0.00 -0.548 0.13 2.314 0.00 0.01 -0.396 0.33 0.133 0.77 0.29 
Xt 1.348 0.00 2.103 0.00 0.693 0.11  1.867 0.00 -0.126 0.64  2.345 0.00 2.800 0.00  
Xt-1 0.716 0.00 1.806 0.00 0.741 0.21   1.199 0.08 0.862 0.22   0.785 0.23 -1.143 0.16  
Rt+1 -0.391 0.00 -0.411 0.00 -0.487 0.00  -0.463 0.00 -0.489 0.00  -0.223 0.00 -0.481 0.00  
DIS 0.001 0.60 0.001 0.48 0.000 0.87  0.001 0.10 0.002 0.02  0.002 0.10 -0.002 0.02  
DIS* Xt+1 0.077 0.00 0.198 0.00 -0.049 0.33 0.00 0.077 0.23 -0.195 0.00 0.04 0.133 0.03 -0.008 0.91 0.04 
DIS* Xt -0.128 0.00 -0.221 0.00 0.056 0.38  -0.218 0.01 0.127 0.00  -0.269 0.00 -0.130 0.37  
DIS* Xt-1 -0.063 0.02 -0.157 0.01 -0.074 0.33  -0.061 0.61 -0.101 0.30  -0.058 0.48 0.229 0.06  
DIS* Rt+1 0.015 0.00 0.019 0.05 0.010 0.28  0.010 0.49 0.003 0.74  0.004 0.64 0.020 0.05  
ACCt   0.006 0.04 0.000 0.94  0.014 0.00 0.000 0.96  -0.004 0.17 -0.002 0.02  
ACCt* Xt+1   0.302 0.00 -0.097 0.08 0.00 0.176 0.00 -0.312 0.00 0.00 0.178 0.01 0.081 0.22 0.23 
ACCt* Xt   -0.145 0.01 0.080 0.26  -0.029 0.69 0.135 0.01  -0.230 0.00 -0.045 0.74  
ACCt* Xt-1   -0.187 0.01 0.000 1.00  -0.116 0.22 -0.028 0.79  0.064 0.53 0.104 0.41  
ACCt* Rt+1   0.002 0.86 0.024 0.02  0.017 0.19 0.026 0.00  -0.021 0.04 0.022 0.08  
DIS*ACCt* Xt+1   -0.026 0.00 0.016 0.04 0.00 -0.007 0.48 0.036 0.00 0.05 -0.010 0.32 0.005 0.65 0.16 
DIS*ACCt* Xt   0.019 0.03 -0.020 0.04  0.010 0.41 -0.027 0.00  0.026 0.03 -0.002 0.93  
DIS*ACCt* Xt-1   0.015 0.12 0.006 0.61  -0.007 0.66 0.003 0.81  -0.004 0.75 -0.013 0.44  
DIS*ACCt* Rt+1   -0.001 0.71 0.000 0.88  0.000 0.95 0.000 0.98  0.001 0.75 0.000 0.87  
Intercept  -0.133 0.03 -0.151 0.02 -0.121 0.09  -0.265 0.00 -0.516 0.00  -0.310 0.00 -0.027 0.75  
Observations 683  683  683   330  418   353  265   
Wald chi-square (p-value)      <  0.001     <  0.001     <  0.001 
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Notes: The first two columns report regression results regarding the estimation of Equation (2), and the remaining columns report on Equation (3). The dependent variable Rt, 
(current returns), and predictor variables Xt-1 (prior earnings) Xt (current earnings), Xt+1 (future earnings), Rt+1 (future returns) and DIS (decile rank of disclosure) are defined in 
the notes to Table 1. ACCt  is the decile rank of the absolute value of operating accruals.  The three panels to the right present regression results with regard to the overall 
magnitude of accruals, negative accruals and positive accruals, in each case firstly for |ΔCO| (absolute current accruals) and secondly for |ΔNCO| (absolute non-current 
accruals). The estimation is feasible generalized least squares regression, designed to control for the presence of heteroskedasticity and for observations that belong to the 
same company (i.e. firm effects) or the same country (i.e. country effects). The Hadi (1994) multivariate outlier detection procedure has been applied. The difference (Diff.) 
columns set out the Wald test of statistically significant differences in coefficients between current and non-current accruals, using a seemingly unrelated regression model.   
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TABLE 3 
The joint effects of accruals and disclosure on the share price anticipation of cash flows 
 
A. All Firm-Year Observations B. Liability Accruals > Asset Accruals 
(net accruals are income-decreasing) 
C.  Liability Accruals < Asset Accruals 
(net accruals are income-increasing) 
 
Total 
Accruals 
Current 
Accruals 
Non-current 
Accruals Diff. 
Current 
Accruals 
Non-current 
Accruals Diff. 
Current 
Accruals 
Non-current 
Accruals Diff. 
 
| CO+ NCO | | CO| | NCO| 
 
| CO| | NCO| 
 
| CO| | NCO| 
 
 
Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t p-value Coeff. t Coeff. t p-value Coeff. t Coeff. t p-value 
CFXt+1 0.154 0.10 -1.193 0.00 0.794 0.02 0.00 -0.336 0.29 1.447 0.00 0.00 -0.906 0.03 -0.575 0.26 0.57 
AXt+1 0.342 0.00 -0.733 0.02 0.970 0.01  0.230 0.53 1.980 0.00  0.036 0.94 -0.570 0.30  
Xt 1.245 0.00 1.829 0.00 0.693 0.13  1.777 0.00 -0.325 0.50  2.829 0.00 2.210 0.02  
Xt-1 0.681 0.00 2.027 0.00 0.740 0.22  1.501 0.01 1.857 0.03  1.307 0.05 -0.392 0.64  
Rt+1 -0.338 0.00 -0.320 0.00 -0.466 0.00  -0.430 0.00 -0.286 0.01  -0.108 0.11 -0.439 0.00  
DIS -0.001 0.60 -0.001 0.40 -0.001 0.32  0.000 0.88 0.000 0.77  0.001 0.19 -0.002 0.09  
DIS* CFXt+1 0.082 0.00 0.187 0.00 -0.035 0.50 0.01 0.057 0.36 -0.064 0.22 0.21 0.139 0.04 0.077 0.33 0.38 
DIS* AXt+1 0.060 0.00 0.129 0.00 -0.051 0.31  -0.058 0.39 -0.166 0.00  0.156 0.03 0.127 0.16  
DIS* Xt -0.115 0.00 -0.188 0.00 0.056 0.41  -0.178 0.01 0.159 0.01  -0.312 0.00 -0.065 0.66  
DIS* Xt-1 -0.059 0.03 -0.186 0.01 -0.073 0.38  -0.144 0.19 -0.240 0.03  -0.086 0.38 0.154 0.20  
DIS* Rt+1 0.009 0.05 0.007 0.55 0.007 0.58  -0.001 0.95 -0.026 0.09  0.000 0.99 0.023 0.08  
ACCt   0.004 0.28 0.000 0.99  0.016 0.00 0.002 0.43  -0.013 0.00 -0.009 0.03  
ACCt*CFXt+1   0.272 0.00 -0.094 0.08 0.00 0.108 0.03 -0.208 0.00 0.00 0.200 0.00 0.162 0.03 0.65 
ACCt*A Xt+1   0.235 0.00 -0.085 0.11  0.053 0.32 -0.243 0.00  0.104 0.16 0.182 0.02  
ACCt* Xt   -0.124 0.05 0.066 0.36  -0.058 0.38 0.156 0.02  -0.300 0.00 0.038 0.78  
ACCt* Xt-1   -0.220 0.01 -0.001 1.00  -0.162 0.05 -0.150 0.20  0.014 0.90 -0.005 0.97  
ACCt* Rt+1   -0.003 0.73 0.027 0.03  0.017 0.16 0.006 0.69  -0.025 0.01 0.013 0.36  
DIS*ACCt* CFXt+1   -0.023 0.00 0.015 0.05 0.00 0.000 0.98 0.021 0.00 0.23 -0.005 0.64 -0.005 0.63 0.84 
DIS*ACCt* AXt+1   -0.018 0.02 0.015 0.05  0.016 0.12 0.029 0.00  -0.009 0.43 -0.013 0.30  
DIS*ACCt* Xt   0.017 0.06 -0.019 0.06  0.009 0.41 -0.031 0.00  0.032 0.01 -0.011 0.59  
DIS*ACCt* Xt-1   0.020 0.07 0.007 0.57  0.004 0.78 0.020 0.19  -0.002 0.89 -0.002 0.91  
DIS*ACCt* Rt+1   0.000 0.81 0.000 0.84  0.001 0.55 0.003 0.15  0.000 0.88 0.000 0.87  
Intercept -0.046 0.46 -0.026 0.75 -0.031 0.67  -0.132 0.09 -0.309 0.21  -0.093 0.41 0.034 0.72  
Observations 683  683  683   352  265   331  418   
Wald chi-square (p-value)      <  0.001     <  0.001     <  0.001 
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Notes: The dependent variable Rt, (current returns), and predictor variables Xt-1 (prior earnings) Xt (current earnings), Xt+1 (future earnings), Rt+1 (future returns), DIS (decile 
rank of disclosure) and ACCt  (decile rank of absolute accruals) are defined in the notes to Tables 1 and 2. Future earnings Xt+1 are replaced in this table by the corresponding 
accrual and cash flow components, AXt+1 and CFXt+1 respectively.  The first two columns report on the estimation of Equation (4), and the remaining columns on Equation 
(5), where the three panels present regression results with regard to the overall magnitude of accruals, negative accruals and positive accruals, in each case firstly for |ΔCO| 
(absolute current accruals) and secondly for |ΔNCO| (absolute non-current accruals).  The estimation is feasible generalized least squares regression, designed to control for 
the presence of heteroskedasticity and for observations that belong to the same company (i.e. firm effects) or the same country (i.e. country effects). The Hadi (1994) 
multivariate outlier detection procedure has been applied. The difference (Diff.) columns set out the Wald test of statistically significant differences in coefficients between 
current and non-current accruals, using a seemingly unrelated regression model.   
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TABLE 4 
Robustness checks   
 
A. All Firm-Year Observations B. Liability Accruals > Asset Accruals 
(net accruals are income-decreasing) 
C.  Liability Accruals < Asset Accruals 
(net accruals are income-increasing) 
 
Current 
Accruals 
Non-current 
Accruals Diff. 
Current 
Accruals 
Non-current 
Accruals Diff. 
Current 
Accruals 
Non-current 
Accruals Diff. 
 
| CO| | NCO| 
 
| CO| | NCO| 
 
| CO| | NCO| 
 
 
Coeff. t Coeff. t p-value Coeff. t Coeff. t p-value Coeff. t Coeff. t p-value 
Panel A. Extending the investigation window (from one year to three years) 
X3t+3 -0.131 0.25 0.359 0.00 0.27 -0.118 0.33 2.235 0.00 0.00 -0.115 0.56 0.356 0.00 0.38 
DIS* X3t+3 0.061 0.00 -0.069 0.00 0.02 0.065 0.00 -0.293 0.00 0.00 0.073 0.00 -0.097 0.00 0.04 
ACCt* X3t+3 0.011 0.41 -0.068 0.00 0.07 0.017 0.22 -0.330 0.00 0.01 0.044 0.13 -0.068 0.00 0.27 
DIS*ACCt* X3t+3 -0.005 0.03 0.015 0.00 0.01 -0.008 0.00 0.050 0.00 0.00 -0.010 0.00 0.018 0.00 0.05 
Number of observations 443  443   212  110   231  333   
Wald chi-square (p-value)    <  0.001     <  0.001     <  0.001 
Panel B. Testing for omitted variables 
Xt+1 -0.820 0.11 1.092 0.03 0.00 -0.948 0.08 1.171 0.02 0.03 -1.574 0.08 0.178 0.82 0.08 
DIS* Xt+1 0.171 0.00 -0.054 0.22 0.01 0.191 0.00 -0.156 0.01 0.03 0.165 0.00 0.031 0.60 0.19 
ACCt* Xt+1 0.229 0.00 -0.122 0.01 0.00 0.221 0.00 -0.287 0.00 0.00 0.226 0.00 0.083 0.25 0.17 
DIS*ACCt* Xt+1 -0.016 0.05 0.021 0.00 0.00 -0.011 0.19 0.038 0.00 0.07 -0.028 0.01 0.005 0.64 0.08 
SIZE* Xt+1 -0.022 0.69 -0.017 0.74  -0.002 0.96 0.097 0.10  0.108 0.19 -0.092 0.28  
GROWTH* Xt+1 0.553 0.00 0.483 0.00  1.554 0.00 -0.642 0.26  0.330 0.00 0.267 0.02  
LOSS* Xt+1 -0.374 0.00 -0.419 0.00  -0.472 0.00 -0.605 0.00  -0.628 0.00 -0.007 0.97  
ADR* Xt+1 0.216 0.11 0.216 0.10  -0.165 0.18 0.204 0.15  0.530 0.00 0.482 0.01  
Number of observations 670  670   347  259   323  411   
Wald chi-square (p-value)    <  0.001     <  0.001     <  0.001 
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Notes: The dependent variable in all estimations is the current return, Rt, (see notes to Table 1 for further details). In Panel A of Table 5, X3t+3 is a three-year sum of reported 
annual earnings, obtained by adding together the income before extraordinary items that is available to ordinary shareholders for each of the three years after the end of year t, 
scaled by market value three months after the end of year t.  Interactions are reported for rank disclosure DIS (see notes to Table 1 for further details) and rank absolute 
accruals ACCt (see notes to Table 3 for further details). For the test for omitted variables reported in Panel B of Table 5, SIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation, 
GROWTH is the annual growth rate in total assets, LOSS is a binary variable that indicates either a loss (1) or a profit (0), and ADR a binary variable based on ADR cross-
listing that indicates either exposure to the US financial market (1) or no US exposure (0). Further explanation of the estimation procedure and table layout can be found in 
the notes to Table 2.  
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APPENDIX 
Country CIFAR 
Composite  
T&D  
Index 
Financial 
Transparency and 
Information 
Disclosure 
Board and 
Management 
Structure and 
Process  
Ownership  
Structure  
and  
Investor Rights 
 Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
Finland 78.2 4 8.3 1 8.0 1 8.5 2.5 7.8 2 
Ireland 79.1 3 8.0 2 7.0 2 8.8 1 7.4 3 
United Kingdom 82.1 1 7.6 3 6.1 5 8.4 4 7.8 1 
France 75.8 5 7.2 4 6.8 3 7.7 9 7.1 4 
Greece 59.8 15 7.0 5 5.5 9 8.5 2.5 6.5 6 
Netherlands 71.4 8 6.9 6 6.1 6 7.4 12 6.9 5 
Sweden 81.8 2 6.7 7 5.7 8 7.7 10.5 6.1 8 
Belgium 67.8 12 6.3 8.5 5.0 10.5 6.9 15 6.1 7 
Norway 75.4 6 6.3 8.5 6.0 7 8.0 6.5 5.0 12 
Switzerland 75.0 7 6.2 10 4.9 12 7.8 8 5.8 9 
Portugal 53.7 17 6.1 11 6.7 4 6.9 16 4.7 14 
Germany 66.0 13 6.1 12 5.0 10.5 8.0 5 4.8 13 
Italy 65.4 14 6.0 13 4.8 14 7.2 13 5.5 10 
Spain 68.2 10 5.9 14 4.8 13 7.1 14 5.3 11 
Denmark 70.6 9 5.5 15.5 4.5 15 7.7 10.5 4.3 16 
Austria 59.7 16 5.5 15.5 3.5 17 8.0 6.5 4.5 15 
Luxembourg 68.0 11 4.0 17 4.0 16 5.0 17 4.0 17 
           
Notes: The country-average CIFAR scores are reported in Hope (2003b), which provides annual report disclosure levels for 1993 and 1995. 
The country-mean T&D scores are obtained from Standard and Poor’s, and are available from their web site: www.standardandpoors.com. 
The composite T&D score can be broken down into three different categories: (i) Financial Transparency and Information Disclosure, (ii) 
Board and Management Structure and Process, and (iii) Ownership Structure and Investors Relations. The scores are available for fiscal years 
2001 and 2002.   
 
 
Figure 1 
The effect of accruals and disclosure on the share price anticipation of future 
earnings  
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Non-current accruals  
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Notes: FERC, the future earnings response coefficient, may refer in this case to the coefficients on 
ACCt*Xt+1 regarding the information contributed by accruals alone, and on the main effects and 
interaction effects ACCt*Xt+1 , DIS*Xt+1 and ACCt* DIS*Xt+1  when assessing the information jointly 
contributed by both accruals and disclosure.  Average disclosure relates to the fifth decile of the 
disclosure metric; maximum disclosure by the tenth and minimum disclosure by the first. The level of 
accruals is represented here by the median scaled accruals per decile.  
 
